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Telecommunication Satellites and Market Forces:
How Should the Geostationary Orbit Be
Regulated by the F.C.C.?
Michael S. Straubel*
I. Introduction
Shortly after the launch of the Syncom II telecommunications
satellite in 1963,' the practicality and utility of the geostationary or-
bit 2 (orbit) became apparent. Telecommunication satellites placed
in the orbit proved to be more reliable, more versatile, and less ex-
pensive to operate than existing terrestrial communication systems.
As a result, a new age of world communication was born. Telecom-
munication satellites now allow instantaneous worldwide communi-
cation, the results of which are continually being felt.3 Coverage of
the Persian Gulf War is perhaps the most vivid recent example of the
use of telecommunication satellites.
Also born with this new age of communications was a race to
exploit the orbit's business potential. There are currently twenty-
nine United States licensed telecommunication satellites dedicated
to domestic services and one dedicated to international service 4 in
the geostationary orbit. By the year 2000, the Center for Space Pol-
icy expects between forty-seven and fifty-four U.S. domestic telecom-
munication satellites to be in orbit. 5 Domestic revenues for both
telecommunication satellite services and satellite sales in the year
* Assistant Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law. J.D. 1982 Mar-
quette University; L.L.M. 1989 McGill University Institute of Air and Space Law.
I Syncom II was the first satellite placed in the geostationary orbit. CENTRE FOR
RESEARCH OF AIR AND SPACE LAW, SPACE ACTIVITIES AND EMERGING INTERNATIONAL LAw 25
(Nicolas M. Matte ed. 1984).
2 A satellite in the geostationary orbit orbits above the equator at an altitude of
22,300 miles (35,800 kilometers). At this altitude the satellite orbits the earth once every
24 hours (equal to the speed of the earth's rotation) and appears to be stationary from any
given point on the earth. DANIEL L. BRENNER & MONROE E. PRICE, CABLE TELEVISION AND
OTHER NONBROADCAST VIDEO § 14.02[l] (1986).
3 Only through the use of telecommunication satellites could the world experience
the events of early June, 1989, in Tiananmen Square as they happened.
4 Telephone Interview with an official from the Common Carrier Bureau of the Fed-
eral Communications Commission (July 5, 1989).
5 CENTER FOR SPACE POLICY, INC., COMMERCIAL SPACE INDUSTRY IN THE YEAR 2000:
A MARKET FORECAST 46 (1985).
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2000 are expected to be between $8.8 and $15.3 billion annually.6
However, the geostationary orbit can only accommodate a finite
number of telecommunication satellites. And, notwithstanding some
temporary technical reprieves, the orbit has begun to reach its satu-
ration point. Therefore, the time has come to ask whether the Fed-
eral Communication Commission's (F.C.C.) current regulatory
system will be adequate to mediate future competing demands for
orbital positions. This Article will explore the existing international
and domestic regimes, assess future demands on those regimes, and
suggest possible changes in the licensing regime to meet those
demands.
II. Technical Background
The geostationary orbit and radio spectrum (orbital-spectrum),
both used by telecommunication satellites, are limited natural re-
sources. Telecommunication satellites are essentially radio stations
in earth orbit. As radio stations, if satellites utilize the same radio
frequency too close to each other, harmful interference between
their transmissions will occur. Therefore, the F.C.C., on the domes-
tic level, and the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), on
the international level, have created rules for the use of the orbital-
spectrum. However, the increasing demands placed upon the orbi-
tal-spectrum are forcing the ITU and F.C.C. to re-evaluate their re-
spective rules. It is the purpose of this Article to examine where
these re-evaluations will lead. However, before embarking on this
mission, an examination of some of the technical matters involved in
the regulation of telecommunication satellites is necessary to under-
stand the issues faced by the ITU and F.C.C.
Radio signals, which include television signals, travel as electro-
magnetic radiation (radio waves) and are measured in hertz or cycles.
The length of radio wave cycles (frequency) can vary from very low
to extremely high frequencies on the radio spectrum. 7 To facilitate
the regulation of radio spectrum use, the radio spectrum has been
divided into frequency bands by the ITU.8 So far three frequency
bands have been identified for telecommunication satellite use.
Those bands are the C-Band (6/4 GHz), the Ku-Band (14/12 GHz),
and the Ka-Band (30/20 GHz). 9 The C-Band is currently the most
used band. The Ku-Band and Ka-Band are not yet heavily used be-
cause the technology needed is more expensive than the technology
6 Id. at 47.
7 CENTRE FOR RESEARCH OF AIR AND SPACE LAW, SPACE ACTIVITIES AND EMERGING
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 21.
8 COMMERCIAL SPACE INDUSTRY IN THE YEAR 2000: A MARKET FORECAST, supra note
5, at 15.
9 Id. at 27.
206 [VOL. 17
GEOSTATIONARY ORBIT REGULATION
necessary to use the C-Band.' 0
The telecommunication satellites that use these different fre-
quency bands can be separated into three categories based on their
uses: fixed satellite services (FSS), broadcast satellite services (BSS),
and mobile satellite services (MSS). I I Fixed satellite services link
one point (a ground station) to another ,point (known as point-to-
point) or from one point to several points simultaneously (known as
point-to-multipoint). Point-to-point service is primarily used for te-
lephony and point-to-multipoint is used by the major television net-
works to distribute their programming nationwide.' 2 Broadcast
satellite service uses high powered satellites to transmit signals di-
rectly to homes equipped with small antenna (2-4 feet in diame-
ter).' 3 Mobile satellite service links any two points, whether fixed or
mobile. A possible mobile satellite service use would be communica-
tion between a trucking service and trucks on the road.' 4 The first
telecommunication satellites were located in low earth orbit. How-
ever, such satellites proved to be difficult and expensive to use be-
cause both the up-link and down-link earth stations had to follow the
satellite across the sky. Additionally, several satellites had to be
orbited to provide continuous coverage as each satellite was only in a
useful position for a limited period of time. In 1963, the first geosta-
tionary satellite, SYNCOM II, was launched. 15 First popularized by
Arthur C. Clark in his paper "Extraterrestrial Relays,"' 16 satellites
placed in the geostationary orbit circle the earth at the same speed
that the earth rotates. Therefore, each satellite appears to remain
fixed above any given point on the earth's surface. Satellites in the
geostationary orbit (35,800 kilometers or 22,300 miles) can provide
twenty-four hour service, and depending on the orbital arc used,
cover all fifty states or link the United States to Europe or Asia in an
economical manner. 17
While outerspace is relatively limitless, the physical characteris-
tics of radio waves limits the number of telecommunication satellites
that can be accommodated in the geostationary orbit. Current tech-
nology and F.C.C. regulations require a minimum separation of two
degrees 20 for the C and Ku Bands to prevent harmful interfer-
10 Id.
I I The F.C.C. recognizes a fourth category of satellite. Radiodetermination satellites
use the propagation properties of radio waves to determine the position, velocity, and
characteristics of an object. However, no commercial radiodetermination satellites are in
service or likely in the near future. 47 C.F.R. § 2.1 (1990).
12 COMMERCIAL SPACE INDUSTRY IN THE YEAR 2000: A MARKET FORECAST, supra note
5, at 27.
'3 Id. at 23.
14 Id. at 24.
15 CENTRE FOR RESEARCH OF AIR AND SPACE LAW, SPACE ACTIVITIES AND EMERGING
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 25.
16 Id. at 23.
17 BRENNER & PRICE, supra note 2, § 14.0211].
1992]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. [VOL. 17
ence.t 8 Considering the need for satellite separation, even if techno-
logical improvements permit closer spacing, the geostationary orbit
will remain a limited resource. Therefore, international and national
regulation of the orbital-spectrum is necessary to realize its maxi-
mum use.
III. International Regulation of Telecommunication Satellites
Because the radio spectrum is a limited physical resource that
does not respect national boundaries, international regulation or at
least international coordination between spectrum users is neces-
sary. International regulation of the radio spectrum and accompany-
ing geostationary orbital positions' 9 is accomplished by the ITU's
conventions and regulations. 20 The ITU is a specialized agency of
the United Nations which (under different names) has regulated and
coordinated international radio, telegraph, and telephone communi-
cations since 1865.21 The rules created by the ITU to govern orbi-
tal-spectrum use are found in the International Telecommunication
Convention and the Radio Regulations. Both the Convention and
the Radio Regulations are frequently amended. 22 The latest version
18 Id. § 14.02[2][a].
19 The ITU also coordinates and regulates telecommunication satellites which are not
in the geostationary orbit. Such satellites are generally regulated and coordinated in the
same manner as satellites which are in the geostationary orbit, except that the concern
over exclusion from the orbit is not present.
20 Two additional intergovernmental agreements regulate the use of telecommunica-
tion satellites. Their impact is, however, much less than that of the ITU. The Treaty on
Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,
Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies provides that outer space including the
moon and other celestial bodies, shall be used freely by all states. Treaty on Principles
Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including
the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, U.S.-U.K.-U.S.S.R., art. 1, 18 U.S.T.
2410, 2412, 610 U.N.T.S. 205, 207 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty]. The treaty also pro-
vides that outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, cannot be subject to
national claims of sovereignty or appropriation. Id. art. II, 18 U.S.T. at 2413, 610 U.N.T.S.
at 208. The Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space requires
the registration of space objects in national and United Nation Registries. Convention on
Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, opened for signature Jan. 14, 1975, art.
II, 28 U.S.T. 695, 698, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15, 17 [hereinafter Registration of Objects
Launched into Space]. The registration include information on the space objects' orbit
and general function. Id. art IV, 28 U.S.T. at 699, 1023 U.N.T.S, at 17.
21 International Telecommunication Convention, Oct. 2, 1947, art. 23, 63 Stat. 1399,
1439, 193 U.N.T.S. 188, 225. See generally GEORGE A. CODDING, JR. & ANTHONY M.
RUTKOWSKI, THE INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION UNION IN A CHANGING WORLD
(1982).
22 The Plenipotentiary Conference of the ITU has, among its other powers, the abil-
ity to revise the convention (article 6 of Convention done in Nairobi, Nov. 6, 1982). The
first such Convention was adopted by the Atlantic City Plenipotentiary Conference in 1947
International Telecommunication Convention, supra note 21. The most recent version of
the Convention was adopted in Nairobi on Nov, 6, 1982, and was ratified by the United
States on Jan. 10, 1986. The Radio Regulations are promulgated and amended by World
Administrative Radio Conferences (WARCs) and Regional Administrative Radio Confer-
ences (RARCs). International Telecommunications Convention, Oct. 25, 1973, art. 7, 28
U.S.T. 2495, 2515, 1209 U.N.T.S. 32, 259. WARCs and RARCs are convened under the
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of the International Telecommunication Convention was drafted in
Nairobi, Kenya, in 1982, and was adopted by the United States in
early 1986.
Presently, under the "first-come, first-served" regulatory system
created by the Convention and Radio Regulations, the ITU first "al-
locates" portions of the radio spectrum to particular types of uses.
Allocation, the first of the two steps in the licensing scheme, is the
distribution of radio frequencies among service categories and occa-
sionally individual countries.23 The service categories cover all
known uses of the radio spectrum and include categories such as ra-
dar, broadcasting, and broadcast satellite services. 24 Allocation is
done at World Administrative Radio Conferences (WARCs) and
given effect by the International Frequency Registration Board
(IFRB)25 through the second step in the "first-come, first-serve" sys-
tem: "registration."
Registration is the process by which a country obtains use of a
portion of the radio-spectrum (and orbit in the case of geostationary
orbit use) for individual users (e.g., T.V. stations, radio stations, and
telecommunication satellites). Before a country proceeds with the re-
gistration process, that country will "assign" individual users a spec-
trum position. Once an assignment has been made by a country, that
country will initiate the registration process with the ITU. The do-
mestic process of assignment in the United States will be covered at
length in section IV of this Article.
The registration process for telecommunication satellites in-
volves the substeps of advanced notification, notification for final re-
gistration, review of the table of allocations, and possibly
coordination. Advanced notification to the IFRB of a proposed sat-
ellite's specifications (including frequency and orbital location) five
years before the scheduled operation of the satellite, while not
mandatory, is designed to allow nations an opportunity to resolve
conflicts before large amounts of capital are expended in the con-
struction of a satellite.26 Following advance notification, notification
for final registration purposes must be given to the IFRB. 27 Upon
procedure spelled out in article 62 of the Convention. Id. art. 62, 28 U.S.T. at 2556, 1209
U.N.T.S. at 284.
23 International Telecommunications Convention, supra note 21, art. 4, 28 U.S.T. at
2514, 1209 U.N.T.S. at 257-58.
24 Glen 0. Robinson, Regulating InternationalAirwaves: The 1979 WARC, 21 VA.J. INT'L
L. 1, 9 (1980).
25 The IFRB is made up of five independent members elected at Plenipotentiary Con-
ferences. International Telecommunications Convention, supra note 21, art. 10, 28 U.S.T.
at 2518, 1209 U.N.T.S. at 261. The IFRB's primary responsibilities are the registration of
frequency assignments and the furnishing of advice to ITU members. Id.
26 Final Acts of the Extraordinary Administrative Radio Conference to Allocate Fre-
quency Bands for Space Radiocommunications Purposes, Nov. 8, 1963, art. 9A, 15 U.S.T.
887.
27 ITU Radio Regulations, arts. N12/9, N13/9A.
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notification, the IFRB reviews the assignment to ensure compliance
with the table of allocations- and regulations and to ensure that the
assignment will not cause harmful interference with an already regis-
tered assignment. If the IFRB finds that the assignment conforms
with the regulations and causes no harmful interference, the assign-
ment is registered in the Master Register of Frequencies.
If harmful interference is found, the assigning country is asked
to modify the assignment as necessary to eliminate the interference.
Sometimes called coordination, under the "first-come, first-serve"
system, the user of the previously registered assignment is not under
an obligation to modify its use of the orbital-spectrum. However, if
the new assignment user can use the orbital-spectrum for four
months without complaints of interference, then the assignment may
be registered. If the new assignment cannot be coordinated, modi-
fied, or used for four months without complaint, the assignment may
still be registered. However, the registration is given the special sta-
tus of being registered "on a non-interference basis."'28 Although
the ITU cannot refuse to register an assignment, very few assign-
ments are registered on a non-interference basis. The loss of the
benefits derived from adhering to the ITU system dissuades coun-
tries from violating and thereby undermining the ITU system. In
this vein, it must be recognized that the benefits of using the ITU
system are the international recognition and corresponding rights
given registered assignments. Where international recognition is
not necessary (systems for domestic use only - no cross border inter-
ference or use), the ITU system is often not used.
Despite its efficiency, not all ITU members like the current
"first-come, first-served" system. Many less developed countries
(LDCs) fear exclusion from the orbital-spectrum. Developed coun-
tries, the LDCs fear, will by overuse foreclose future use of the orbi-
tal-spectrum. Though the ITU, through its members, has adopted a
resolution stating that frequency assignments do not create perma-
nent priority rights in a frequency assignment,29 existing telecommu-
nication satellites have priority over later coming satellites that might
28 ITU Radio Regulations, arts. N12/9 Nos. 4310A-4310/C & N13/9A No. 4616.
29 Final Acts of the World Administrative Radio Conference For Space Communications, Res.
No. Spa 2-1 ITU(Geneva 1971). Resolution Spa 2-1 in part reads:
i. that the registration with the I.T.U. of frequency assignments for
space radiocommunication services and their use should not provide any per-
manent priority for any individual country or groups of countries and should
not create an obstacle to the establishment of space systems by other coun-
tries;
2. that, accordingly, a country or group of countries having registered
with the I.T.U. frequencies for their space radiocommunication services
should take all practicable measures to realize the possibility of the use of
new space systems by other countries or groups of countries so desiring;
3. that the provisions contained in paragraphs I and 2 of this Resolu-
tion should be taken into account by the administration and the permanent
organs of the Union.
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interfere with the existing satellite. Therefore, because of this prior-
ity system and the extensive use of the geostationary orbit by devel-
oped countries, the LDCs have pushed- for an assignment system
which guarantees their access to the geostationary orbit. Many LDCs
have endeavored to replace the "first-come, first-served" system with
an a priori system for obtaining orbital-spectrum slots.30
The effort to create an a priori system for orbital-spectrum use
was carried out in the Radio Regulation amendment process. Radio
Regulations, which supplement the convention, are adopted and
amended at World Administrative Radio Conferences (WARCs) and
Regional Administrative Radio Conferences (RARCs). 3 l At the 1979
WARC in Geneva, the LDCs successfully presented Resolution BP(3)
calling for an a priori planning of the orbital-spectrum and the con-
vening of two subsequent WARCs to decide which space services and
frequency bands should be planned.32 The first of these two WARCs
was held in 1985.
30 An a priori system of frequency and orbital position regulation uses administrative
conferences to subdivide and allot radio frequencies and orbital positions to countries in
advance of need or use. On the other hand, an a postenon system requires subsequent
satellites operators to coordinate with pre-existing satellites to avoid harmful interference.
See M. Rothblatt, ITU Regulation of Satellite Communication, 18 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1, 10-11
(1982).
31 Multinational Telecommunication Convention with Annexes and Final Protocol,
Oct. 25, 1973, art. 7, 28 U.S.T. 2495(1976-77).
32 Final Acts of the World Administrative Radio Conference, Res. BP No. 3, ITU
(Geneva, 1979). Resolution BP reads:
Considering:
a) that the geostationary-satellite orbit and the radio frequency spec-
trum are limited natural resources and are utilized by space services;
b) that there is a need for equitable access to, and efficient and economi-
cal use of these resources by all countries as provided for in Article 33 of the
International Telecommunication Convention (Malaga-Torremolinos, 1973)
and Resolution 2;
c) that the utilization of radio frequencies and the geostationary-satellite
orbit by individual countries and groups of countries can take place at vari-
ous points in time, based on their requirements and the availability of the
resources at their disposal;
d) that there are growing requirements all over the world -for orbital
position and frequency assignments for the space services;
e) that in the use of the geostationary-satellite orbit for space services,
attention should be given to" the relevant technical aspects concerning the
special geographical situation of particular countries;
resolves
1. that a world administrative radio conference shall be convened not
later than 1984 to guarantee in practice for all countries. equitable access to
the geostationary-satellite orbit and the frequency bands allocated to space
services;
2. that this conference shall be held in two sessions;
3. that the first session shall:
3.1 decide which space service and frequency bands should be
planned;
3.2 establish the principles, technical parameters and criteria for
the planning, including those for orbit and frequency assignments of
the services and frequency bands identified as per 3. 1, taking into ac-
count the relevant technical aspects concerning the special geographi-
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
The first of the two WARCs, 33 WARC-ORB-85, held in Geneva,
decided on a two-step approach (dual-plan) for ensuring equitable
access for all countries to the orbital-spectrum. First, an allotment
plan, guaranteeing at least one orbital position to each ITU member
for domestic satellite service, was approved for parts of the expan-
sion bands (lightly used portions of the C and Ku Bands).3 4 Second,
"an improved procedure," probably consisting of periodic mul-
tiplanning meetings, were to be developed for the distribution of or-
bital positions outside the allotted expansion bands.35 However,
WARC-ORB-85 left the particulars of both steps to be worked out at
a second WARC, WARC-ORB-88. Despite the potential for rancor-
ous debate and political divisions, WARC-ORB-88 completed the
charge of Resolution BP(3) and completed the details of the dual-
plan developed by WARC-ORB-85 with relatively little dissention.
However, the allotment plan, for technical reasons more than polit-
ical reasons, proved to be the source of some problems.
The allotment plan gives each ITU member sufficient positions
in the orbital-spectrum to provide complete national coverage.3 6
Two hundred and forty allotments were assigned to the ITU's 165
members. The geographically larger countries, like the United
States, received as many as three allotments.3 7 Each allotment is
currently in the form of a predetermined arc, which consists of a
nominal position and ten degrees to either side of the position.38 As
each country moves to use its allotment, it is able to position its satel-
cal situation of particular countries; and provide guidelines for
associated regulatory procedures;
3.3 establish guidelines for regulatory procedures in respect of
services and frequency bands not covered by paragraph 3.2;
3.4 consider other possible approaches that could meet the ob-
jective of resolve 1;
4. that the second session shall be held not sooner than twelve months
and not later than eighteen months after the first session and implement the
decisions taken at the first session.
33 The first Space WARC is formally known as the First Session of the World Admin-
istrative Radio Conference on the Use of the Geostationary-Satellite Orbit and the Plan-
ning of the Space Services Utilizing It.
34 The allotment plan will apply to 300 Megahertz (MH) in the C band (both up-link
and down-link) and 500 MH, in the Ku band (both up-link, and down-link). Milton L.
Smith, Space WARC 1985 - Round One Ends, 2 AIR & SPACE LAw. 1 (Summer/Fall 1985).
35 The "improved procedures" will be modifications of the Radio Regulations that
govern the normal process for obtaining use of the orbital-spectrum. See World Adminis-
trative Radio Conference on the Use of the Geostationary Orbit and the Planning of the
Space Services Utilizing It, Addendum to Report to the Second Session of the Conference.
36 See app. 30B of the Final Acts of WARC-ORB-88; Top of the Week: U.S. Pleased with
WARC Results, BROADCASTING, Oct. 10, 1988, at 41-42.
37 The United States received two allotments: the first at 159 degrees west to cover
Alaska, Hawaii, and Guam and the second at 101 degrees west to cover the continental
United States and Puerto Rico. Id. at 42.
38 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, ITU WORLD ADMINISTRATIVE RADIO CON-
FERENCE FOR THE SPACE SERVICES: REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION 21 (1988)
(hereinafter SPACE SERVICES CONFERENCE).
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lite anywhere within its predetermined arc as the demands of coordi-
nation with existing satellites dictate.
The allotment plan applies to only the so-called expansion
bands. Targeted for the allotment plan at WARG-ORB-85, only the
frequency bands chosen at the 1979 WARC for additional fixed satel-
lite service use come within the plan's preview.39 By so limiting the
allotment plan to the expansion bands, the developed countries ef-
fectively continued the first-come, first-served regime for the con-
ventional bands.40
The most controversial aspect of the allotment plan was the ac-
commodation of satellite systems that were currently being used or
were planned for future use in the expansion bands. 41 The devel-
oped countries, particularly the United States, wanted their existing
systems to be considered on the same basis as national allotments.
The compromise developed at WARG-ORB-88, which involved a
good deal of technical work to find a position for all allotments and
existing systems, 42 requires existing systems to bear the burden of
adjusting to accommodate national systems and requires existing
systems to discontinue their use in twenty years. 43
The second plan envisioned in the dual-plan developed at
WARC-ORB-85 proved to be less troublesome than the allotment
plan. The call for an "improved procedure" (the second plan) for
the distribution of positions within the conventional bands (other
than the expansion bands) had started in 1985 with the concept of
multilateral planning meetings (MPMs). 44 As originally proposed by
39 Id. at 1. The expansion bands are:
(1) 4500 to 4800 MHz (down link) and 6725 to 7025 MHz (up link) (6/4 ghz
or C-band)
and
(2) 10.70 to 10.95 GHz (down link) and 11.20 to 11.45 GHz (down link) and
12.75 to 13.25 GHz (up link) (14/11-12 GHz or Ku-band)
Within the band each orbital position will have a bandwidth of 800 mhz. Id. at 21.
40 A major objective of the United States negotiating team at WARC-ORB-88 was to
limit the allotment plan to the expansion bands. The United States felt that if the allot-
ment plan was applied to the conventional bands, the already heavy U.S. investment in
domestic satellites and the growth of domestic satellite communications would be
threatened. d. at 17.
41 The United States has two existing systems, each comprised of two satellites, in the
expansion bands. American - ISI has a satellite at 56 degrees west and one at 58 degrees
west. Pan American Satellite has a satellite at 57 degrees west and one at 45 degrees west.
Id. at 42.
42 The computer software (programs) to pick each country's pre-determined arc, de-
veloped before the WARC-ORB-88 session, proved to be inadequate. Many long hours
were put in by programming experts from both the ITU and member delegations in fash-
ioning a program that would produce a list of pre-determined arcs. Id. at 24.
43 While the results of WARC-ORB-88 nominally limit the life of an existing system
to twenty years, a compromise in the language of the final act may allow for a longer life.
The compromise allows two countries to displace a national allotment "if agreed to" by
the countries affected. Id. at 42. Systems are included in the plan if information on the
system was transmitted to the IFRB before October 5, 1988. Id. at 29.
44 Multilateral planning meetings, as the name suggests, are meetings where more
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
the United States, MPMs were to take the place of the allotment
plan.4 5 However, the MPM concept soon began to take on the chiar-
acteristics of a WARC, with decisions to be taken by a vote of all ITU
members. Some ITU members saw the MPM concept as a way to
extend the allotment concept or a priori planning to the conventional
bands. This turn in events was more than the United States had en-
visioned and would have threatened the existing "first-come, first-
served!' system then in place. This bureaucratic system for obtaining
positions in the orbit promised to cost United States operators more
money.46
While MPMs were retained by WARC-ORB-88, MPMs are now
an informal and voluntary method of coordination and not the bind-
ing and formal process intended by countries such as Kenya. The
United States' efforts resulted in MPMs being used only when a
country has experienced major coordination difficulties. While any
country may call an MPM, countries are not obligated to participate.
Further, the results of an MPM are considered to be agreements be-
tween participants only and neither bind nor prejudice the rights of
non participants. 47
Thus, after WARC-ORB-88, a two-track scheme exists at the in-
ternational level for licensing telecommunication satellites in the ge-
ostationary orbit. The "first come, first served" system is still the
general rule for obtaining a position in the orbital-spectrum. How-
ever, now portions of the orbital-spectrum are covered by the allot-
ment plan exception to the general rule. While this two-track system
will lead to a more equitable use of the orbital-spectrum, it signals
the coming of the end of the relatively unlimited access to the orbi-
tal-spectrum enjoyed by the developed countries and particularly the
United States. The two-track system is flexible and will allow the
United States to license most of its proposed satellites in the near
future. However, the combination of the ITU's two-track system and
the continuing growth of satellites in the orbital-spectrum will force
the United States to reexamine its current domestic licensing
scheme.
IV. United States Regulation of Telecommunication Satellites
The international regulatory regime just described is the envi-
ronment to which the United States must conform when it decides to
license a telecommunications satellite. However, because of the
"first-come, first-served" system of the ITU, not until the recent de-
than two administrations work out coordination problems between existing and proposed
uses or plan the use of a particular portion of the orbital-spectrum.
45 SPACE SERVICES CONFERENCE, supra note 38, at 42.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 4, 40-42.
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velopments in ITU procedures has the United States been forced to
take international pressures on the use of the geostationary orbit
into consideration. Therefore, most of the development of the
United States' regulatory regime has taken place without concerns
about international constraints. The following history of the regimes
for telecommunication satellites providing domestic services (dom-
sats) and telecommunication satellites providing international serv-
ices shows the evolution of the regime from a regime looking solely
toward domestic concerns to a regime starting to feel the pressures
of international concerns.
A. Satellites Providing Domestic Satellite Services
Shortly after the utility, of the geostationary orbit had been
demonstrated, 48 attention within the United States began to focus on
the private, commercial use of telecommunication satellites. In
1965, the American Broadcasting System's (ABC) request for per-
mission to orbit a domsat prompted the F.C.C. to initiate a compre-
hensive study of the regulatory issues raised by the use of domsats.49
Up to this time only governmentally owned and operated satellites
were in orbit. The F.C.C.'s study resulted in a policy designed to
accommodate all qualified operators that has come to be known as
the "open skies" policy.
By 1970 the F.C.C. had completed the initial phase of its policy
review. In Establishment of Domestic Communication-Satellite Facilities by
Non-Governmental Entities (Domsat 1),50 the F.C.C. announced that the
national interest would be best served by licensing non-governmen-
tally owned and operated telecommunication satellites. In reaching
this conclusion, the F.C.C. looked at two fundamental questions:
first, did the F.C.C. have the legal authority to regulate the construc-
tion and use of domsat systems, and second, if the F.C.C. had such
authority, how would the public interest be best served.
5
'
In analyzing the first question, the F.C.C. noted three provisions
of the Federal Communications Act of 1934.52 First,'all nongovern-
ment owned radio stations must be licensed by the F.C.C. 5 3 Second,
a radio station is defined as a station equipped to engage in radio
48 In July, 1963, NASA's Syncom satellite became the first satellite to achieve and
remain in geostationary orbit. Later, in 1965, Intelsat launched Intelsat I ("Early Bird")
into geostationary orbit. BRENNER & PRICE, supra note 2, § 14.02[l].
49 ABC requested F.C.C. approval to establish a satellite system to transmit program-
ming from earth stations to affiliate stations nationwide. ROBERT R. BRUCE ET AL., FROM
TELECOMMUNICATIONS TO ELECTRONIC SERVICE: A GLOBAL SPECTRUM OF DEFINITIONS,
BOUNDARY LINES, AND STRUCTURES 262 (1986).
50 22 F.C.C.2d 86 (1970) (hereinafter DOMSAT I).
51 Id.
52 Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934)(codified as amended at
47 U.S.C. §§ 151-617 (1988)).
53 47 U.S.C. §§ 301, 303, 305, 307, 308, 309 (1988).
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communications. 54 And, third, radio communication is defined as
the "transmission by radio of writing, signs, signals, pictures, and
sounds of all kinds, including ... [among other things, the receipt,
forwarding, and delivery of communications] incidental to such
transmissions."5 5 Together, these three provisions led the F.C.C. to
the conclusion that because a telecommunication satellite is a radio
station engaged in receiving and forwarding radio communications,
domsats (the space segment and earth-stations) may be regulated by
the F.C.C.5 6
The second question, just how such authority should be used,
has proven to be more difficult to answer. In Donuat I, the F.C.C.,
after finding that domsats would positively contribute to the nation's
communication system,5 7 announced that it was unable at that time
to choose between the various proposed satellite systems and regula-
tory schemes.5 8 Therefore, the Commission would take applications
from all qualified entities and examine the details of each proposed
system or regulatory regime before authorizing a particular system
or regime. 59 Each proposal would be measured against what was in
the public interest as defined in section I of the 1936 Communica-
tions Act. 60
54 Id. § 153(k).
5 Id. § 153(b).
56 DOMSAT I, Appendix C - Memorandum on Legal Issues, 22 F.C.C.2d 86, 129.
57 The Commission concluded that satellite technology held the potential of provid-
ing improved and economical point-to-point communication, point-to-multipoint commu-
nication, and record communication services. Further, satellite technology held the
promise of advantages at that time unforeseeable. DOMSAT I, 22 F.C.C.2d at 88.
58 Id. at 93.
59 The systems and regimes proposed to the F.C.C. were:
(1) Specialized systems
The Ford Foundation and ABC proposed a special purpose point-to-
point multipoint system devoted to the distribution of television programs.
(2) Multipurpose systems
Comsat and domestic common carriers proposed a multipurpose system
capable of accommodating all types of satellite services on a common carrier
basis.
(3) Part specialized, part multipurpose system
General Electric proposed a system that would divide satellite services
into specialized services for large users and multipurpose services for the
remaining users.
(4) Common carrier regime
In 1968, the Johnson Administration proposed that a multipurpose sys-
tem be developed with the space segment (satellites) being owned by Com-
sat. Then, after three years of operation, the plan would be evaluated.
(5) Unrestricted access ("open skies ") regime
In 1970, the Nixon Administration proposed an open entry system
which would essentially allow any financially qualified public or private entity
to operate a domsat for its own needs. No ranking of potential users would
be allowed to restrict operators. Common carriers and private users would
have the same right of access. The F.C.C. would have the right to modify or
rescind the operating rights of established spectrum users in order to accom-
modate new users. DOMSAT I, 22 F.C.C.2d at 90-92.
60 Section 1 of the Communications Act in part reads:
For the purpose of regulating interstate and foreign commerce, in communi-
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Two years after Domsat I, the F.C.C., in Domsat 11,61 decided that
the best way to test and develop satellite technology was through a
multiple entry policy; later dubbed the "open skies" policy. 6 2 The
Commission rejected selecting a single system or conducting com-
parative hearings6 3 reasoning that both methods would not realize
the Commission's objectives, namely:
(a) to maximize the opportunities for the early acquisition of
technical, operational, and marketing data and experience in the use
of this technology as a new communications resource for all types of
services;
(b) to afford a reasonable opportunity for multiple entities to
demonstrate how any operational and economic characteristics pe-
culiar to the satellite technology can be used to provide existing and
new specialized services more economically and efficiently than can
be done by terrestrial facilities;
(c) to facilitate the efficient development of this new resource
by removing or neutralizing existing institutional restraints or inhi-
bitions; and
(d) to retain leeway and flexibility in our policy making with re-
spect to the use of satellite technology for domestic communications
so as to make such adjustments therein future experience and cir-
cumstances may dictate.
64
While the open skies policy appears to have been shaped by a
free enterprise approach, the decision to adopt the open skies
method was equally founded on technical considerations. In Domsat
//, the Commission had eight applications for domestic satellite sys-
tems before it. 65 Of those eight systems, only Comsat sought a mo-
nopoly grant. 66 In rejecting Comsat's monopoly approach to the use
of domestic telecommunication satellite technology, the Commission
noted that the selection of one or just a few of the proposed systems
would force the selection of one satellite technology over another. 67
Such a selection, at this formative stage in the development of tele-
communications technology, might inhibit and retard the develop-
ment of new, innovative, and competing technology. 68 Further, by
reducing orbital separations to three degrees, all eight applicants
cation by wire and radio, so as to make available, so far as possible, to all the
people of the United States a rapid, efficient, nationwide, and world-wide
wire and radio communication service with adequate facilities at reasonable
charges, for the purpose of national defense ...
47 U.S.C. § 151 (1988).
61 Domestic Communication-Satellite Facilities by Non-Governmental Entities, 35
F.C.C.2d 844 (1972) (hereinafter DOMSAT II).
62 Id. at 847.
63 The comparative hearing requirement was first discussed in Ashbacker Radio
Corp. v. F.C.C., 326 U.S. 327 (1945).
64 DOMSAT II, 35 F.C.C.2d at 847, 850.
65 Establishment of Domestic Communications-Satellite Facilities by Non-Govern-
mental Entities, 34 F.C.C.2d 9, 27 (1972)( F.C.C. staff report later cited in DOMSAT II).
66 Id. at 29.
67 Id. at 33.
68 d.
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could be accommodated. 6 9 Therefore, the Commission decided to
not foreclose any applicant from proving that it could survive in the
market place. 70 Any applicant capable of showing the requisite fi-
nancial, technical, and other qualifications, including potential for
serving the public benefit, would be allowed to deploy domsats in the
geostationary orbit.7 1
Using the open access policy and procedures announced in Dom-
sat II, the F.C.C. licensed nine domsats between 1972 and 1980.72
However, by 1980, the large number of applications for domsat
licenses forced the F.C.C. to re-examine its open skies policy. 7" The
F.C.C., in In the Matter of Assignment of Orbital Locations to Space Stations
in the Domestic Fixed-Satellite Service (Orbit Deployment Plan),74 was
faced with the problem of the number of domsat applications possi-
bly exceeding the number of available positions in the usable geosta-
tionary orbital arc.75 While the final number of applications did not
force the F.C.C. to abandon the open skies policy, the F.C.C. did
point out that future domestic demands and international use of the
orbital arc forced it to adopt a flexible policy. 76 Particularly, the
Commission reserved the authority to change orbital assignments in
the future should changing circumstances require the accommoda-
tion of additional satellites. Also, all assignments are considered
temporary and subject to relocation on thirty days' notice. 7 7 There-
fore, as of 1981, though under pressure, the F.C.C. was able to con-
tinue the open skies policy.
69 Id. at 29.
70 DOMSAT II, 35 F.C.C.2d at 850, 860.
71 Though called an open skies policy, the policy announced by the F.C.C. in DOM-
SAT II was not a policy of "unlimited or unrestricted open entry." Id. at 850. Applicants
were required to meet financial and technical standards, and AT&T and Comsat were al-
lowed only restricted use of domsats. AT&T was initially limited to non-specialized serv-
ices such as message toll telephone (MIT) and wide area telephone services (WATS). The
Commission restricted AT&T's entry into specialized services out of a fear that the other
qualified, but smaller, competitors would be driven or discouraged from the market by
AT&T's market power, created by its monopoly over terrestrial telephone services. The
Commission feared that AT&T could cross subsidize its specialized satellite services or use
its terrestrial public switched service dominance to monopolize the specialized services
market. Similarly, Comsat, because of its monopoly in international satellite services as
the sole U.S. participant in Intelsat, was required to form a separate corporate subsidiary
to engage in domestic satellite ventures and was forbidden from joining in a joint venture
with AT&T as anything other than a carrier's carrier. Id. at 847-52.
72 Assignment of Orbital Locations to Space Stations in the Domestic Fixed-Satellite
Service, 84 F.C.C.2d 584, 587 (1981).
73 Of the applications filed on or before May 1, 1980, the construction of twenty-five
new satellites and the launch of twenty other new or previously constructed satellites were
authorized. Id. at 585.
74 84 F.C.C.2d 584 (1981).
75 For U.S. domsat use, the orbital arc bounded by 119 degrees West and 135 degees
West provides coverage for all fifty states and the orbital arc bounded by 55 degrees West
and 148 degrees West provides coverage for the contiguous forty-eight states. Id. at 599.
76 Id. at 612.
77 Id. at 601.
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In 1983, the open skies policy was again tested when the F.C.C.
was faced with more applications than spots available on the orbital
arc. This time, again, the F.C.C. was able to avoid discarding the
open skies policy. By reducing the orbital spacing between satellites
and using the batch system of processing where all the applications
received over a specified period of time are processed together, the
F.C.C. was able to continue its policy of providing entrepreneurial
opportunities for the expansion of existing systems and the entry of
new systems. 78 The preservation of the open skies policy in 1983
came at a price. By reducing the spacing from four degrees to two
degrees for the C-Band 79 and from three degrees to two degrees for
the Ku-Band, the F.C.C. forced system operators to use more expen-
sive equipment.80 Also, to assure the maximum use of orbital arc
locations, minimum technical standards and deployment dates were
established. 81 The combination of these measures permitted the
F.C.C. to delay deciding between conflicting applications, though
many of the applicants urged a prioritizing of applications. 82
In 1985, the F.C.C. was again faced with a batch of domsat appli-
cations that exceeded the number of available orbital locations. 83
This situation forced the F.C.C. to seriously examine alternative poli-
cies and to discuss the demise of the open skies policy. Applicants in
In the Matter of Licensing Space Stations in the Domestic Fixed-Satellite Ser-
vice84 proposed five alternatives to the open skies policy. Those al-
ternatives were: (1) a preference for new entrants; (2) a preference
for established carriers; (3) comparative hearings; (4) lotteries; and,
(5) auctions. 85
However, by strictly enforcing the licensing requirements first
announced in the 1983 Processing Order, 86 the F.C.C. was able to
eliminate enough unqualified applicants to avoid denying licenses to
qualified applicants and thereby avoid scrapping the open skies pol-
icy.87 Particularly, the F.C.C. now requires proof of sufficient finan-
cial resources to construct, launch, and operate the proposed
78 Licensing of Space Stations in the Domestic Fixed-Satellite Service and Related
Revisions, 48 Fed. Reg. 40,233, 40,234 (1983).
79 Because of the extensive use of the C-Band and the cost of immediately imple-
menting the 2 degrees spacings, the F.C.C. adopted a transitional spacing plan of 3 de-
grees, 2.5 degrees, and 2 degrees spacings for the C-Band. Id.
80 Id. at 40,235.
81 Id. at 40,244, 40,246.
82 Among the arguments made by applicants was that existing operators should be
given preference because those operators have proven their ability to supply market de-
mands. Id. at 40,245.
83 Licensing Space Stations in the Domestic Fixed-Satellite Service, 101 F.C.C.2d
223-24 (1985).
84 Id.
85 Id. at 225.
86 93 F.C.C.2d 1260 (1983).
87 Licensing Space Stations in the Domestic Fixed-Satellite Serv., 101 F.C.C.2d at
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satellite for one year.88 Also, in the case of existing systems, appli-
cants hoping to expand their system must produce proof that more
than eighty percent of its existing transponder capacity is being
used.89
Therefore, since its formulation in 1972 in Domsat II, the open
skies policy has retained its fundamental character despite the pres-
sure of increased demand for orbital locations. Rather than employ-
ing an alternative method, such as comparative hearings or auctions,
the F.C.C. has been able to continue the open skies policy by adjust-
ing and tightening licensing requirements and conditions. While an
argument can be made that the F.C.C. has rendered the open skies
concept empty by withholding licenses from all but the clearly finan-
cially qualified, the regulations are only speeding up the natural se-
lection process of the market place.90  The nature of the
telecommunications market naturally excludes unsupported new en-
trepreneurs. When the cost of constructing a telecommunication
satellite, launching the satellite, insuring the satellite, and providing
ground control services are added together the total will likely ex-
ceed $300 million.9' Such a cost barrier will exclude all but exper-
ienced operators or the well-financed who can afford to buy
experience. However, more well-financed operators are seeking
licenses.
Domsats are not the only United States satellites seeking
licenses and thereby putting pressure on the capacity of the orbit.
Recently, privately operated satellites offering international services
have begun to seek and have been granted licenses. Satellites offer-
ing international services add to the need for a comprehensive and
new regime for licensing satellites in the geostationary orbit.9 2
88 The F.C.C. then amended part 25 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations to
detail the financial requirements. See 47 C.F.R. § 25.391 (1990).
89 Following the 1983 Processing Order, 93 F.C.C.2d 1260 (1983), the F.C.C. re-
stricted newly authorized systems to two orbital locations and existing operators to re-
placement locations unless the applicant demonstrates concrete need for additional orbital
locations. To meet this standard applicants must show that the additional satellites will
have 80% of their capacity utilized within three years. Also, existing operators must al-
ready be using 80% of their existing satellite's capacity. Licensing Space Stations in the
Domestic Fixed-Satellite Serv., 101 F.C.C.2d at 235-37.
90 The financial requirements articulated in In the Matter of Licensing Space Stations
in the Domestic Fixed-Satellite Serv., 101 F.C.C.2d 223 (1985), prevents the licensing of a
system without extensive committed capital. Thus, only applicants who have sources of
income other than from the proposed satellite system will receive licenses. This means
that only existing system operators, organizations with other business income, or organi-
zations capable of raising capital from large lenders will meet the requirements. Few en-
trepreneurs gambling on their ability to tap future market forces will be able to obtain a
license.
91 Licensing Space Stations in the Domestic Fixed-Satellite Serv., 101 F.C.C.2d at
231. 92 Demand for satellite telecommunication services may be reduced by the use of
fiber optics in terrestrial systems. Fiber optic lines are both cost competitive and quality
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B. Satellites Providing International Services
The story of United States regulation of domestically owned
satellites providing international services begins with the Communi-
cations Satellite Corporation (COMSAT), a statutorily created quasi
private entity. From there the story moves to the International Tele-
communications Satellite Consortium (INTELSAT), an entity
designed to operate as a nonprofit provider of -worldwide satellite
telecommunications. And, finally, the story focuses on the question
of whether INTELSAT can survive the introduction of competing
private satellite systems.
In 1961 the Soviet Union was ahead of the United States in de-
veloping a communication satellite system.93 Fearing that the So-
viet's lead would cause third world countries to turn to the Soviet
Union for their communication needs,94 the Kennedy Administra-
tion initiated and Congress passed the Communications Satellite Act
of 1962 (Satellite Act).95 The Satellite Act called for the creation of a
quasi-private corporation which would spearhead the organization of
an international satellite consortium. 96 This quasi-private corpora-
tion (COMSAT) was to operate as any other private corporation, ex-
cept for its objective. 97 Specifically, Congress declared that
COMSAT shall "be responsive to public needs and national objec-
tives, which will serve the communication needs of the United States
and other countries, and which will contribute to world peace and
understanding. ' 98 Therefore, while COMSAT was to be a for profit
organization, significant governmental oversight would be required.
To realize the dual objectives of turning a profit and implement-
ing United States foreign policy, Congress gave COMSAT a tradi-
tional corporate structure with some modifications. Like other
corporations, COMSAT can issue shares of common stock with vot-
ing rights.99 However, unlike other corporations, fifty per centum of
issued stock is reserved for purchase by communication common
carriers as authorized by the F.C.C., and fifty per centum of the
shares are available to the public (non-common carriers).' 00 Again
competitive with satellite transponders for point-to-point communications. Interview with
Professor Edgar J. Luecke, Valparaiso University School of Engineering (June 27, 1988).
93 PAULJOHNSON, MODERN TIMES: The World from the Twenties to the Eighties 615 (1983).
94 Id.
95 Communication Satellite Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-624, 76 Stat. 419, (codified at
47 U.S.C. §§ 701-744 (1983)).
96 Communication Satellite Act, 47 U.S.C. § 701(c).
97 There was extensive debate within Congress over the form that COMSAT should
assume. The proposals ranged from a wholly private corporation to a government-owned
utility. The resulting form was a compromise between the two extremes. See DELBERT D.
SMITH, COMMUNICATIONS VIA SATELLITE, A VISION IN RETROSPECT 93-108 (1976).
98 Communication Satellite Act, 47 U.S.C. § 701.
99 Id.
100 Id. § 734(b).
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like other corporations, a board of directors, with fifteen members,
oversees COMSAT. l0 l However, six board members are elected by
non-common carrier stockholders, six board member are elected by
common carriers, and the remaining three members are appointed
by the President of the United States. 102 Further, the President of
the United States is charged with supervising COMSAT's relation-
ship with foreign governments, foreign entities, and intexnational
bodies to assure that these relationships are consistent with the na-
tional interest and foreign policy of the United States. 10 3 Together
these features have created a rather unique business entity with some
inbred conflicts of interest.
With the domestic component of an international telecommuni-
cation system in place, the United States proceeded to negotiate the
construction of an international telecommunications system.
Although COMSAT preferred a system based upon a series of bilat-
eral agreements, the State Department's preference for a multilateral
arrangement was ultimately implemented. 0 4 Thereby, at a meeting
of the ITU in October of 1963, the foundation of a global satellite
communication union was discussed. 10 5 The following year nineteen
nations signed the Interim Arrangements for a Global Commercial
Communications Satellite System 10 6 and gave birth to the Interna-
tional Telecommunications Satellite Consortium (INTELSAT).
During the life of the Interim agreement, prior to the enactment
of a definitive agreement, COMSAT played a dominant role in the
operation of INTELSAT. Pursuant to the Interim Arrangements,
COMSAT was given sixty-one percent of the voting power because
of its share of the initial contribution required to start the system. 10 7
This voting power, along with COMSAT's role as the systems gen-
eral manager responsible for the design, construction, operation,
and maintenance of the system, 10 8 gave COMSAT virtually unre-
strained control over INTELSAT.10 9 While COMSAT can be
credited with using this control to build a reliable international satel-
lite system, many members of INTELSAT were unhappy with COM-
101 Id. § 733(a).
102 Id.
103 Id. § 721(a)(4).
104 SMITH, supra note 97, at 131-35.
105 HERBERT I. SCHILLER, MASS COMMUNICATIONS AND AMERICAN EMPIRE 131-32
(1969).
106 Multinational Communication Satellite System, Aug. 20, 1964, 15 U.S.T. 1705,
514 U.N.T.S. 26.
107 Each signatory to the Interim agreement was asked to contribute a portion of the
estimated $200,000,000.00 necessary to start the system. In turn, each signatory's voting
share was based upon its contribution. Id. arts. IV, V, VI, Annex to the Interim
Arrangement.
108 Id. art. VIII.
109 JONATHAN F. GALLOWAY, THE POLITICS AND TECHNOLOGY OF SATELLITE COMMUNI-
CATIONS 158 (1972).
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SAT's management and eventually won a modification of
INTELSAT's management structure.
Perhaps the major cause of discontent with COMSAT's manage-
ment of INTELSAT can be traced to COMSAT's procurement prac-
tices. While European countries had. made twenty-five percent of the
original contributions to INTELSAT, they received only four percent
of INTELSAT's procurement contracts. 10 Ninety-five percent of
the $380 million spent by INTELSAT between 1964 and 1971 was
spent within the United States."' In addition to its procurement
practices, COMSAT was criticized for its day-to-day management of
INTELSAT. One representative to INTELSAT attributed this prob-
lem to the three and sometimes conflicting roles played by COM-
SAT."t 2 COMSAT functioned as a U.S. for profit common carrier,
as the U.S. representative to INTELSAT, and as the general manager
of INTELSAT. After protracted negotiations, a definitive INTEL-
SAT agreement was reached in 1971 and became effective in
1973.113 The definitive agreement created four operating organs
within INTELSAT: the Assembly of Parties, the Meeting of Signato-
ries, the Board of Governors, and the Director General. 1 4 The pri-
110 Jordan R. Kerner, Note, The Communications Satellite Corporation: Toward a Workable
Telecommunications Policy, 27 HASTINGS L. J. 740 (1976).
111 MICHAEL E. KINSLEY, OUTER SPACE AND INNER SANCTUMS 119 (1976).
112 Id. at 115.
113 Agreement Relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organiza-
tion "INTELSAT," Aug. 20, 1971 [1972], 23 U.S.T. 3813.
114 The powers and duties of the four organs are as follows:
Assembly of Parties: The Assembly is responsible for representing the in-
terests of the parties as sovereign states and setting long term goals for IN-
TELSAT. Accordingly, each signatory has one vote within the Assembly and
substantive matters must be approved by a two-thirds vote. Among the As-
sembly's most important powers is the appointment of the Director General
and the power to make a finding in the form of a recommendation on
whether separate telecommunications systems will technically or economi-
cally interfere with the operation of INTELSAT pursuant to Article XIV. See
Article VII of the INTELSAT Agreement. Id.
Meeting of Signatories: Members of the Meeting of Signatories are the en-
tities authorized by states to conduct their telecommunications operations.
As the United States has done, states may authorize private entities as their
representative to the Meeting of Signatories. Each representative has one
vote within the Meeting of Signatories. The Meeting of Signatories' primary
function is to oversee INTELSAT's financial affairs. See Article VIII of the
INTELSAT Agreement, Id.
Board of Governors: The Board of Governors consists of 27 members
coming from one of three categories: (1) signatories with an investment
quota of 1.5% or greater, (2) one representative of two or more signatories
with a combined investment quota of 1.5% or greater, and (3) one represen-
tative from each of five regions (as designated by the ITV) who represents at
least five signatories from that region. Investment quota is determined by a
signatory's usage of the INTELSAT system. The Board of Governors is re-
sponsible for the design, development, construction, establishment, opera-
tion, and maintenance of the INTELSAT space segment. In other words, the
Board of Governors is the primary body within INTELSAT and controls the
actual operation of the system. Decisions by the Board of Governors is based
upon the investment quota for substantive issues. An affirmative vote must
consist of either two-thirds of all the investment quota, constituted by at least
N.C. J. IN-r'L L. & COM. REG.
mary difference between the Interim agreement and the definitive
agreement is the existence and function of the Board of Governors
and Director General. The Board of Governors and Director Gen-
eral now have the responsibility of managing INTELSAT; once the
responsibility of COMSAT.' 15 However, though COMSAT's invest-
ment quota and therefore voting power has decreased over the years,
within the Board of Governors, where voting power is based upon a
parties investment quota, COMSAT still possesses the largest vote:
now twenty-four percent." 16
From 1973 until 1988, with the exception of some regional sys-
tems, l1 7 INTELSAT was the only provider of commercial interna-
tional satellite telecommunication services. As of 1985, INTELSAT
served 170 countries and territories and carried two-thirds of all
overseas communications.' 18 However, in 1985 the United States
determined that competition with INTELSAT in international satel-
lite telecommunication services, within defined areas, was appropri-
ate and the first satellite to directly compete with INTELSAT was
launched in 1988. In 1983 Orion Satellite Corporation filed an ap-
plication to launch a separate international satellite system and
thereby started the F.C.C.'s deliberations on the question of INTEL-
SAT competition. 19 However, because of foreign policy implica-
tions and section 102(d) of the Communications Satellite System Act
of 1963 (Satellite Act), the F.C.C. delayed action on Orion's applica-
tion until after the Executive Branch had examined the issue. 120 Pur-
suant to section 102(d) the President must find separate
communications satellite systems to be in the national interest before
a license may be issued. 12 1 On November 28, 1984, President Rea-
gan determined that separate communication satellite systems were
four governors or all governors but three. See Articles IX and X of the IN-
TELSAT Agreement, Id.
Director General: The Director General of INTELSAT, appointed by and
responsible to the Board of Governors, oversees the day-to-day operations of
INTELSAT. As the executive of INTELSAT, the Director General has many
ministerial duties including the role of legal representative of INTELSAT.
See Article XI and Annex A of the INTELSAT Agreement, Id.
115 See id. art. XII for details on the transition of control from COMSAT to the Direc-
tor General.
116 ROBERT R. BRUCE, FROM TELECOMMUNICATIONS TO ELECTRONIC SERVICES 270
(1986).
117 The regional systems now in operation include ARABSTA, PALAPA, and INTER-
SPUTNIK. See RICHARD R. COLINO, The Possible Introduction of Separate Satellite Systems: Inter-
national Satellite Communications at the Crossroad, 24 COLUM. J. TRANSNATION'L L. 13, 19 n. 18
(1985).
118 Id. at 16.
119 See In re Application of Orion Satellite Corp., 101 F.C.C.2d 1302(1985).
120 Cheryl L. Sarreals, International Telecommunications Satellite Services: The Spirit of Coop-
eration Versus the Battle for Competition, JURIMETRICS J. 267, 291 n. 142 (1986)(citing letter
from David J. Markey, Assistant Secretary of Commerce and Diana Lady Dougan, Coordi-
nator, International Communications and Information Policy, Department of State, to
Mark S. Fowler, Chairman, F.C.C. (April 6, 1983)).
121 47 U.S.C. § 721(a)(6)(1983).
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"required in the national interest" as defined within section 102(d)
of the Satellite Act.' 22 Later, on February 8, 1985, the Departments
of State and Commerce jointly submitted "A White Paper on New
International Satellite Systems" (White Paper) to the F.C.C. which
detailed the President's policy grounds for his previous finding. 123
The White Paper was prepared by the Senior Interagency Group on
International Communication and Information Policy (SIG), a group
made up of representatives from fourteen executive agencies. 124
The President, as stated in the White Paper, found that by re-
stricting the separate systems to providing "customized" services the
U.S. could continue its commitment to INTELSAT and yet stimulate
competition in international satellite communication services. Arti-
cle XIV(d) of the INTELSAT agreement requires each signatory who
establishes a separate system "to avoid significant economic harm to
the global system of INTELSAT." Significant economic harm would
be avoided, according to the President, by restricting separate sys-
tems to providing "the sale or long-term lease of transponder or
space segment capacity for communications not interconnected with
public switched message networks."' 125 By restricting separate sys-
tems to non public-switched services, INTELSAT's "core" revenues
could be protected. The President reasoned that by fencing off
"public-switched traffic," as he defined public-switched traffic,
eighty-six percent of INTELSAT's 1983 revenues would be pro-
tected. ' 26 Therefore, significant economic harm would not occur be-
cause the separate systems would be unable to compete with a
majority of INTELSAT's service offerings and INTELSAT is in a
good position to compete for the customized (unprotected non pub-
lic-switched traffic) services market.' 27
Shortly after the President's determination, the F.C.C., in In the
Matter of Establishment of Satellite Systems Providing International Communi-
cations (Separate Systems), 128 found competition with INTELSAT to be
in the public interest and authorized the licensing of three (eventu-
122 Pres. Determ. No. 85-2, 49 Fed. Reg. 46987 (1984).
123 Report No. 1-4032, placed in C.C. Docket No. 84-1299, on February 11, 1985, for
the record of the proceedings of Establishment of Satellite Systems Providing Interna-
tional Communications, 101 F.C.C.2d 1046 (1985) (hereinafter Separate Systems).
124 See Separate Systems, 101 F.C.C.2d at 1054. See also Senior Interagency Group on
International Communication and Information Policy, A White Paper on New Interna-
tional Satellite System 1 n.l(1985)(available in F.C.C. file for cc Docket No. 84-1299).
125 Letter from George P. Schultz, Secretary of State, and Malcolm Baldridge, Secre-
tary of Commerce, to F.C.C. Chairman Fowler (November 28, 1984). Separate Systems,
101 F.C.C.2d at 1090. Public switched message services are message telephone services
(MTS),,telex, telegraph, teletext, facsimile, TWX, and high speed switched data services.
Id. at 1101.
126 See id. at 1089-90, 1097-99.
127 d. at 1056.
128 101 F.C.C.2d 1046 (1985).
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ally six) separate systems. 1 29 The F.C.C. placed three basic restric-,
tions on the new separate systems: (1) all licensees could provide
only the sale or long-term lease of transponders or space-segment
capacity for communications not interconnected with public-
switched message networks, except for emergency restoration ser-
vice; (2) the first restriction must be enforced against all levels of
resellers and users of the separate systems; and (3) licensees must
enforce all restrictions through contractual and other means and
resellers must enforce the restrictions on their customers. Addition-
ally, each licensee must obtain the authorization of the necessary for-
eign authorities 30 and enter into consultations with INTELSAT to
ensure technical compatibility and to avoid significant economic
harm as is required by article XIV(d) of the INTELSAT
agreement. ' 3 '
Much of the F.C.C.'s Separate Systems opinion focused on the ad-
vantages competition would bring to the users of satellite telecom-
munication services. Using the U.S. domestic satellite industry as an
example, the F.C.C. concluded that the pressures of the marketplace
will provide new diversity in satellite services, create markets in new
areas of satellite services, create incentives for INTELSAT to operate
more efficiently, promote the development of new satellite technol-
ogy, and encourage outside financing sources to invest in more spec-
ulative communication ventures. These conclusions were supported
by customer complaints of existing INTELSAT services. Among
those complaints were assertions that INTELSAT charged more than
comparable U.S. domestic service, that INTELSAT does not offer
the sale or long term lease of transponders (necessary for the needs
of some customers), and that INTELSAT does not offer the services
proposed by some of the proposed separate systems (users could use
small, low-cost earth stations not available through INTELSAT).13 2
Predictably, INTELSAT and many of INTELSAT's users were
concerned by the F.C.C.'s decision and reasoning. In 1984, a report
commissioned by INTELSAT concluded that the introduction of
separate systems that compete with INTELSAT would work against
the interest and objectives of INTELSAT.13 3 Additionally, both the
Meeting of Signatories and Assembly of Parties of INTELSAT
adopted resolutions urging INTELSAT members to refrain from and
129 Id.
130 Because international communications require the cooperation of the sender state
(e.g. the United States) and the receiving state (e.g. the United Kingdom), a foreign com-
munications entity, usually a government controlled entity, must cooperate in the estab-
lishment of a separate satellite telecommunications system.
131 Separate Systems, 101 F.C.C.2d at 1054.
132 Id. at 1065, 1087.
133 INTELSAT, Final Report on the Study of the Economics of International Satellite
Communications 8 (May 18, 1984) (Attachment No. I to BG-59-34E) (prepared by Walter
Hinchman Associates, Inc.).
226 [VOL. 17
GEOSTATIONARY ORBIT REGULATION
oppose actions which would threaten the viability of a single global
system.' 3 4 However, despite these reservations and concerns, the
Assembly of Parties,' 3 5 pursuant to the recommendations of the Di-
rector General and Board of Governors, found that the operation of
five Ku-band transponders between the United States and Peru by
PanAmSat would not cause significant economic harm to
INTELSAT. 3 6
• I Recently, the United States, United Kingdom, and Germany
have requested consultation with INTELSAT pursuant to article
XIV(d). Each country seeks coordination for the use of six Ku-band
transponders on the PanAmSat satellite now located at 315 degrees,
for nonpublic switched message service. As of the date of writing,
the Director General has recommended to the Board of Governors
and the Assembly of Parties that no incompatibility be found.' 3 7
In reaching his recommendation, the Director General adopted
the results of a previous study that concluded that significant eco-
nomic harm to the INTELSAT system would not result if the cumu-
lative loss of revenue from all separate systems remained below 10%
during a ten year planning horizon.' 38 In PanAmSat's case, the Di-
rector General projected revenue loss to INTELSAT of 2.6%. This
projection, coupled with the 6.4% estimated loss from all existing
separate systems, resulted in a total projected loss of 9.0%, below
the 10% ceiling.' 3 9 Therefore, though the proposed PanAmSat
would compete with and draw traffic away from INTELSAT, as long
as PanAmSat provides only nonpublic switched message service no
significant economic harm will befal INTELSAT. If INTELSAT's
Assembly of Parties adopts the Director General's recommendation,
approves PanAmSat's U.S. to Europe service, and thereby employs
the 10% revenue loss test for significant economic harm, the U.S.
policy of open entry for international telecommunication satellites
will have run into a major roadblock. That roadblock is the 10%
revenue loss ceiling. Within the next ten year planning horizon, the
134 INTELSAT meeting of Signatories, Record of the Thirteenth Meeting, MS-13-3
14 (Apr. 18-21, 1983); INTELSTAT Meeting of Signatories, Record of Decisions of the
Fourteenth Meeting, MS-14-3E 22(Apr. 9-12, 1984); INTELSTAT Assembly of Parties,
Record. of Decisions of the Eighth Meeting, AP-8-3E 21(Oct. 3-6, 1983); INTELSAT
Assembly of Parties, Record of Decisions of the Ninth (Extraordinary) Meeting, AP-9-3-E
14 (Jan. 29-31, 1985); INTELSTAT Assembly of Parties, Record of Decisions of the
Tenth Meeting, AP-10-3E 32(c), 33(a)-33(b) (Oct. 11, 1985).
135 Within the INTELSAT organizational framework, the Director General makes rec-
ommendations to the Board of Governors which in turn tenders advice to the Assembly of
Parties which makes the final determination.
136 Article XIV(d) Consultation Concerning the Use of the Pan Am Sat Satellite Net-
work to Provide Telecommunication Services Between the United States and the United
Kingdom, BG-76-50E 5/6/88, May 27, 1988.
137 INTELSAT document "Addendum No. 1" to BF-76-50E 5/6/85, June 13, 1988.
138 INTELSAT document, BG-76-50E, 5/6/88, May 27, 1988, p. 8.
139 Id. at 9.
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period used by INTELSAT for testing traffic loss, the United States
cannot license separate systems which would cause more than 1 %
loss in revenue to INTELSAT. With the current cumulative revenue
loss suffered by INTELSAT standing at 9%, 1% or more in lost reve-
nue would put the total over the 10% ceiling and would amount to
significant economic harm as defined by the Director General. IN-
TELSAT is not likely to allow such an action and would find any
additional separate system to be a significant economic threat. The
United States, in such a situation, would be faced with a choice be-
tween its open skies policy or the INTELSAT system. The next ap-
plication to launch an international telecommunication will bring the
question to a head.
V. The Alternative Licensing Schemes
Faced with the increasing demand for orbital-spectrum slots and
the decrease in available orbital slots after WARC-ORB-88, the open
skies licensing philosophy of the F.C.C. 1cannot long continue. Soon,
if not already, the F.C.C. will face more viable license applications
than it has currently technically feasible orbital slots.' 40 Therefore,
in order to carry out its congressional mandate of providing "to all
the people of the United States a rapid, efficient, nationwide, and
worldwide... communication service .... ,,141 the F.C.C. must move
from the licensing system of the open skies policy to a method of
selective licensing. But, if the F.C.C. is to meet the judicially created
test for its conduct of assuring the "public convenience, interest, or
necessity," what form should a new licensing method take? 142
Before moving to discuss a new selection method, the goals of a
selection system must be established. Of course, these goals must
work to the public's benefit. But defining what is in the public's best
interest has and will be controversial. Nevertheless, few would disa-
gree with the goals of (a) stimulating technological development, (b)
stimulating competition (competition in price, quality of service, and
variety of service), and (c) preventing monopolistic or near monopo-
listic control of the orbital-spectrum. 43 In fact, these goals can be
140 If all technically feasible slots are not taken, the economically and technically desir-
able slots have been taken. Currently the only unassigned orbital locations are at the
edges of the orbital arc usable for the United States and are primarily in the more expen-
sive to use ku band. Locations at the edges of the usable orbital arc generally provide
poorer coverage. Therefore, in terms of desirable slots, the orbital-spectrum has reached
its current capacity.
141 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1988).
142 In interpreting the FCC licensing guidelines,the Court has stated that the Com-
mission's touchstone for exercising its authority is "the public convenience, interest, or
necessity." See Federal Communications Commission v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309
U.S. 134, 137-38 (1939).
143 Many would argue that competition by its very definition means the absence of
monopolistic control. Whether this is correct or not, domination of the orbital-spectrum
would create concerns other than economic. Domination of the orbital-spectrum could,
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'seen in the earliest of the F.C.C.'s statements on orbital-spectrum
'management. 144
One important feature of the satellite telecommunications in-
dustry, that until recently was a basic assumption, is that all telecom-
munication satellites operated as common carriers and as such had
rates regulated by the F.C.C. under title II of the Communications
Act. However, in 1982 the F.C.C. authorized the sale of transpon-
ders on a limited basis in Domestic Fixed-Satellite Transponder Sales
(Transponder Sales Order).' 4 5 Though the F.C.C. will closely scru-
tinize sale applications to ensure that sufficient common carrier ca-
pacity exists, the Transponder Sales Order policy will effect regulatory
policy decisions by reducing the quantity of transponders available
to the general public. One might argue that by taking some tran-
sponder capacity out of the common carrier category, the result of
the Transponder Sales Order is that the orbital-spectrum resource has
been made even more scarce. Beside the fact that fewer satellite op-
erators will offer common carrier services, it is quite arguable that
the new transponder owners will not utilize their transponders to
their maximum capacity and thereby cause the orbital spectrum to be
less efficiently used than when common carriers were able to sell
otherwise unused time at reduced prices.146 The result may be a re-
duced supply, higher prices, and greater demand on the orbit.' 47
A second basic feature of the telecommunications industry that
may effect the use of and regulation of the orbital-spectrum is the
competition posed by optical-fiber technology.' 48 At the service
despite the F.C.C.'s best efforts, lead to the exclusion of uses and users. The exclusion of
users could mean the exclusion of messages. Congress and the F.C.C. have long at-
tempted to ensure diversity in broadcast licenses. If the orbital-spectrum becomes the
dominant method of disseminating broadcast signals, the dominant user of the orbital-
spectrum could exclude unfavored messages. Also, national security concerns may require
a nonmonopolistic market.
144 See Domsat II, 35 F.C.C.2d 844, 846 (1972).
145 Domestic Fixed-Satellite Transponder Sales, 90 F.C.C.2d 1238 (1982), aff'd,
WOLD Communications, Inc. v. F.C.C., 735 F.2d 1465, 1468 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
146 One owner of a transponder could quite possibly not have a need to use all of a
transponder's channel capacity. In addition, he may not use the transponder around the
clock. Therefore, unless the owner is able to resell this unused capacity (which may be
more difficult for an owner not familiar with the common carrier market for telecommuni-
cations than an experienced common carrier), transponder capacity will go unused.
147 Though the majority of satellites in the orbit should operate as common carriers to
ensure widespread access to and efficient use of the orbit, the geostationary orbit does not
fit the traditional definition of a common carrier. Traditionally, common carriers fall into
the category of "natural monopolies" such as electric and telephone companies. Natural
monopolies exist when the need for large initial investments cause the average cost of the
units produced by two or more competitors to not drop below the cost per unit of the first
competitor to enter the market. While satellite operators experience large initial invest-
ments, technological advances have been reducing the cost per unit rather quickly and
substantially since the orbit was first put to use.
148 Fiber-optic cables now link the United States to Europe and the far east. While
fiber-optic cables are not yet used for television signals, fiber-optic cables now compete
with satellites for long-haul (transAtlantic and transPacific) phone calls, computer traffic,
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level, optical-fibers can provide or possibly even exceed the services
provided by telecommunication satellites. However, the high cost of
installing optical-fiber cables to individual users will delay the wide-
spread use of optical-fibers. 149
To date, three types of selective licensing methods have been
proposed by writers or used by the F.C.C. Those methods are lotter-
ies, auctions, and comparative hearings. Each method has its merits
and must be evaluated separately in terms of its ability to meet the
above mentioned goals of stimulating technology, stimulating com-
petition, and preventing a monopoly of the orbital-spectrum. Each
method can probably be adapted, in some degree, to achieve the
stated goals.
A. Comparative Hearings
Comparative hearings have been used to select between mutu-
ally exclusive broadcast license applications since 1945.150 The com-
parative hearing process is required when two or more applications
are found to be mutually exclusive.' 5 ' In the process, the F.C.C.'s
two primary objectives are to first secure the best practical service to
the public and second to maximize the diffusion of control of the
medium of mass communications. 152 The factors considered by the
F.C.C. in pursuing its two primary objectives are (a) whether the ap-
plicant will bring diversification of control of the medium of mass
communications, (b) whether the owners (applicant) will participate
in station operations, (c) whether the applicant's programming will
serve the public's needs, (d) whether the applicant's past operation
of a station suggest good future operation, (e) whether the applica-
tion will result in efficient use of the frequency, and (f) the character
of the applicant.' 53
Comparative hearings were developed for competing broadcast
and video conferences. 1st Fiber-optic Pacific Cable Links U.S., Japan, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 19,
1989, § 3, at 3.
149 Fiber-optics will not reach residential and small business users for some time be-
cause of the high cost of replacing the existing copper network with fiber-optical cables. A
national fiber-optic distribution system is estimated to cost at least 200 billion. R. NATHAN,
TELEVISION MANUFACTURING IN THE UNITED STATES: ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTIONS-PAST,
PRESENT, AND FvTruREF3, Co. 6 (Elecs. Indus. Ass'n 1988).
150 Comparative hearings were first required by the Supreme Court in Ashbacker Ra-
dio Corp. v. F.C.C., 326 U.S. 327, 333 (1945).
151 The test for mutual exclusivity will be very important to orbital-spectrum applica-
tions. The F.C.C. has extended the definition of "mutually exclusive" to include applica-
tions that would have a "substantial and material adverse effect upon the other's prospect
for success." Little Dixie Radio, Inc., 11 R.R.2d 1083 (1967). This is a very broad defini-
tion that could be widely applied to orbital-spectrum license applications. However, so far
the F.C.C. has concluded that as long as the F.C.C. can accommodate a new applicant on
the orbital-arc, there is no mutual exclusivity. Domestic Fixed Satellite Service, FCC 83-
183 (released June 20, 1983), 53 R.R.2d 1597 (1983).
152 Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, I F.C.C.2d 393, 394 (1965).
153 Id. at 394-99.
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* license application. If comparative hearings were employed for se-
lecting orbital-spectrum licensees, the criteria evaluated would have
to be modified. Orbital-spectrum users are not broadcasters, they
are primarily common carriers and in some instances rebroadcasters.
-Only if an entire satellite was employed by a broadcaster as its pri-
mary means of signal distribution would the license application take
on the features of a broadcasting license. In the majority of situa-
tions, the applicant will be a common carrier or operate sufficiently
enough like a common carrier to be treated like a common carrier
for licensing purposes.
The criteria that the F.C.C. should look at in a comparative hear-
ing for an orbital-spectrum license should include some of the crite-
ria from the broadcasting comparative hearings and new criteria.
From the broadcasting hearings the F.C.C. should ask (a) whether
the applicant will bring diversification of control of the media of
mass communications, (b) whether the applicant's past operations of
a satellite suggests good future operation, (c) whether the applica-
tion will result in efficient use of the frequency, and (d) the character
of the applicant. In addition to these criteria, or perhaps as elabora-
tion of criteria (c) above, the F.C.C. should inquire (e) whether the
proposed satellite will be technically superior to preceding satellites
or the competing satellite and (f) whether the satellite operator in-
tends and has the capability to offer competitive prices to consumers.
The use of these six criteria in a comparative hearing should allow
the F.C.C. to achieve the three goals listed at the beginning of this
section.
By requiring an applicant to show that it will bring diversifica-
tion of control to the medium of mass communication, the goal of
preventing monopolistic control will be met and the goal of stimulat-
ing competition will be furthered. By requiring a showing of good
past operation of a satellite, efficient use of the frequency, and tech-
nical superiority, the goal of stimulating technical development and
furthering competition will be met. And, finally, a showing of good
character and lower prices will meet the goal of stimulating competi-
tion. Therefore, aside from the effectiveness of comparative hear-
ings and other considerations that will be examined later,
comparative hearings can be used to achieve the goals set out earlier.
B. Lotteries
Lotteries, as a method of licensee selection, were authorized by
Congress in 198 1.154 After the amendment, by Congress, of this au-
thorization in 1982,155 the F.C.C. promulgated regulations to com-
plete the details of the lottery system and eventually employed a
154 47 U.S.C. § 309(i).
155 Id. § 309(i)(3)(A).
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lottery method for the selection of initial licensees to operate Low
Powered Television Stations. 156 Generally, the lottery system is
rather simple. Applications for initial licenses are assigned numbers
for the lottery, with qualifying minority applicants receiving a prefer-
ence in the form of additional numbers.' 5 7 After the lottery winner
is identified, petitions to deny may be filed. 158
To use this lottery system for orbital-spectrum license applica-
tions, some modifications and additions would be necessary to meet
the objectives of stimulating technical development, competition,
and a nonmonopolistic market.159 First, the limitation of the method
to only initial licenses would have to be eliminated. Instead, as orbi-
tal-spectrum locations opened up, assuming either a time limit on
existing licenses or the satellite becoming inoperable, 160 a lottery be-
tween applications for each open location would have to be held.
Second, a preliminary review of an application to ensure minimum
technical competence and financial support would be necessary. A
process like that announced in the 1983 Processing Order would be ap-
propriate. 161 Such a preliminary review would be necessary to pre-
vent speculative filings.
In order to encourage technical developments within a lottery
system, the F.C.C. would be required to give applications judged
technically innovative a preference - additional numbers - in the lot-
tery. However, the granting of a preference to technically innovative
applications could be seen as nothing more than a comparative hear-
ing in lottery clothing since the F.C.C. would be forced to judge an
application's technical merit.
To prevent monopolistic control of the orbital-spectrum when
assigning lottery numbers to applicants, the F.C.C. would also have
to give additional numbers to new players in the satellite-telecommu-
nications market. Alternatively, during any post lottery hearing on a
petition to deny, the F.C.C. could closely scrutinize whether the li-
censee will contribute to market diversity. Finally, while a lottery sys-
tem that produces diversified satellite operators will most likely
produce a price competitive market, there is no certainty that a vari-
ety of innovative services will be produced. To ensure a variety of
services, the F.C.C. would have to award additional lottery numbers
to applicants proposing unique and innovative services.
156 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.1601-1.1604, 1.1621-1.1623 (1983).
157 Applicants who meet the minimum ownership levels of 47 C.F.R. § 1.1622(b) and
are either Black, Hispanic, American Indian, Alaska Natives, Asians, or Pacific Islanders,
receive a larger block of numbers for the lottery. Id. §§ 1.1621, 1.1622, 1.1602.
158 Id. § 1.1604.
159 Currently, the definition of "media of mass communication," used to describe
when a lottery may be used, might exclude telecommunication satellites. This definition
would have to be amended.
160 Currently licenses have a maximum life of ten years. 47 U.S.C. § 307(c)(1983).
161 93 F.C.C.2d 1260 (1983).
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A lottery system can be developed to achieve the goals of Domsat
I. However, the system would have many of the features of a com-
parative hearing. The F.C.C. would be forced to evaluate features of
each application in order to determine if the applicant should receive
preferential treatment (additional numbers). Such evaluation would
demand F.C.C. time and might even be subject to Ashbacker compara-
tive hearing requirements. 162
C. Auctions
Auctions, or some other method of employing market forces to
make licensing decisions, have been proposed by a number of differ-
ent sources for some time now.' 63 Perhaps the most influential of
these proposals was made by Professor R.H. Coase.'6 Though Pro-
fessor Coase's proposal was targeted primarily on broadcast licens-
ing, the principles of his proposal can be easily adapted to orbital-
spectrum licensing.
When creating an auction system, the fundamental decision of
how far the use of market forces is to be taken must be made. At a
limited level, an auction would be used to determine license holders
but further sale would be strictly controlled. Also, the F.C.C. would
continue to closely regulate the operation of geostationary satellites.
At the other extreme, an auction would be used to distribute orbital
locations, the winning bidders would own and be able to resell the
orbital locations, and the F.C.C. would act as little more than a traffic
cop to protect the owner's rights. The choice between these two ex-
tremes hinges on an analysis of the role and value of the public
trustee model of regulation for the orbital-spectrum.
Congress, through the Federal Communications Act, has de-
clared the radio spectrum to be the common property of the citizens
of the United States. 165 As such, the federal government has the re-
sponsibility of regulating the use of the spectrum so as to achieve the
greatest public good. 166 This is the public trustee model. Implicit in
the public trustee model is the exclusion of private ownership of the
spectrum. Therefore, unless Congress is willing to abandon the
public trustee model (and the res communis nature of the spectrum),
the full use of market forces (complete ownership and alienation
rights) to manage the orbital-spectrum will not happen.' 67 Never-
162 See supra notes 150-53 and accompanying text.
163 The use of auctions, as a method of employing market forces, to realize the pub-
lic's best interest, is likely within the F.C.C.'s authority. See F.C.C. v. WNCN Listener's
Guild, 450 U.S. 582 (1981).
164 R.H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2J. L. & ECON. 1 (1959).
165 This declaration is limited by the interests of other countries as spelled out in the
Convention of the International Telecommunications Union. International Telecommuni-
cation Convention, supra note 21.
166 See 47 U.S.C. § 309(a).
167 Professor Coase would nevertheless continue to argue that market forces would
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theless, within the bounds of political reality, an auction model that
utilizes as much market forces as is politically feasible is possible.
In an auction system, to be true to a market model, the F.C.C.
would conduct little more in the way of a preliminary evaluation of
bidders than to check the application to ensure compliance with
United States obligations to the ITU and INTELSAT. The pressures
of the market place would shape the features of the application. The
public's demand for services (or the entrepreneur's best guess of
what the public 'will buy) would shape whether the satellite will be
built to provide point-to-point public switched services, point-to-
multipoint service, direct broadcast service, common carrier services,
or the sale of transponders. The financing for the satellites construc-
tion and launch would also depend on the market's perception of the
project's viability.
Letting market forces shape what the application looks like is
really nothing new. The open skies system already allows this. The
really tough question is whether the F.C.C. should let market forces
shape what is bid upon. Currently the F.C.C. determines orbital
spacing and frequency allocation. Could the objectives of the public
trustee model be satisfied if potential bidders were allowed to nego-
tiate between themselves on how close satellites would be located
and upon which frequencies they would operate?
If the F.C.C. determines orbital spacing and frequency use, only
the services offered by satellite operators and not the technology of
spectrum use will be driven by market forces. Market forces will not
speed the technology that allows more efficient use of the orbital-
spectrum through closer spacing. The development of technology
that would allow closer orbital spacing will be in the hands of the
F.C.C. Only when the F.C.C. determines that existing technology
will allow closer orbital spacing will progress in increasing the
number of satellites on the orbit be made. This method would have
the regulatory regime respond to advances in technology rather than
having the regulatory regime stimulate technological advances. The
policy of not restricting technological possibilities, the policy under-
lying the open skies system, would seem to support the use of market
forces to set orbital spacing and frequency use within designated
spectrum bands.
Therefore, an auction system that uses market forces to their
maximum extent, without allowing for the private ownership of the
orbital-spectrum, would have the following basic features. When an
orbital location capable of accommodating at least one telecommuni-
cations satellite becomes available, the F.C.C. would take preliminary
ultimately achieve the better public good. According to Professor Coase, through the
market the public, rather than the government, could decide what kind of services and in
what amount would be offered.
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applications and review them for compliance with ITU and INTEL-
SAT requirements. If more than one application is received, the
F.C.C. would set a minimum price for an orbital-spectrum license
and allow applicants to negotiate over how the arc will be used
before bidding begins. Applicants would be able to negotiate any
..use of the arc that does not interfere with neighboring users of orbi-
.tal-spectrum.' 68 Applicants, whether they have reached an agree-
ment or. not, would then bid on licenses. After the bidding was
complete, the F.C.C. would review the winning applicants for their
ability to not interfere with neighboring users and in the absence of
an agreement, United States international obligations. Satisfying
this review, licenses lasting the useful life of the satellite would be
issued.
Such an auction system would stimulate technological develop-
ment. Under the system, satellite operators would feel the pressures
of the market to become more competitive. Technological advances
make an operator more competitive. Auctions would stimulate price,
quality, and variety of service competition because licensees will
need to recoup their costs. To recoup their costs, licensees must
attract as many customers as possible. However, preventing monop-
olistic control of the orbital-spectrum would not be guaranteed with
the auction system. It is conceivable that one or a few operators
could outbid all other applicants. 169 The prevention of monopolistic
control of the orbital-spectrum would have to be left to anti-trust
laws or the F.C.C. in some kind of post bidding screening system.
VI. The Best System
Which method, comparative hearings, lotteries, or auctions will
produce the greatest technological development, competition, and
nonmonopolistic market for orbital-spectrum services? To answer
this question the likelihood of each method' reaching the stated goals
and any other collateral benefits or detriments must be evaluated.
Of the three methods, a lottery system appears to be the least
efficient in producing the desired goals. Except when the F.C.C. is
extensively involved in screening applicants, a lottery system will not
necessarily lead to the selection of an efficient competitor, let alone
one of the best. Even with preferences being given to applicants
with desirable attributes, uncompetitive or subpar applicants can win
a lottery. Further, a lottery system, even with preferences given to
technically innovative applications, will not stimulate technological
168 Applicants could even ask and negotiate with neighboring users for the neighbors
to modify their use of the orbital-spectrum.
169 Professor Coase would argue that such a result would not be bad though. An op-
erator's ability to outbid other applicants merely means that the operator has and will be
able to put the orbital-spectrum to the most efficient use as determined by the market.
.1992]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
advances to the degree that either auctions or comparative hearings
would. Because a lottery license is free, aside from the application
preparation costs inherent in any licensing scheme, a licensee will
have less start up costs to recover and therefore less incentive to cap-
ture a large share of the market with innovative technology. Also, in
a lottery system the F.C.C. will continue to determine where a satel-
lite may be positioned. When the F.C.C. decides where a satellite
may be positioned, positioning is done according to accepted tech-
nology rather than according to innovative technology, driven by the
desire to reduce costs through innovation, and the give and take of
negotiations between potential orbital-spectrum neighbors.
As for price competition, if we assume a worst case scenario of a
seller's market' 70 for telecommunication services, a lottery method
appears to offer no advantage over either an auction or comparative
hearing method. The exception may be that because of a relatively
free license, the licensee will feel less pressure to operate efficiently
in order to recover fixed costs.
Between auctions and comparative hearings, auctions offer the
most promise. Comparative hearings, assuming an impartial pro-
cess, 171 can produce technical innovation when competing appli-
cants try to out do one another. However, as with lotteries, the
F.C.C. will still select orbital-spectrum Spacings and the benefits of
competitive driven technological innovations and neighbor negotia-
tions will be lost. Similarly, comparative hearings will result in a di-
versity of services and a nonmonopolistic market if the F.C.C. values
those characteristics in making its choices. However, it is arguable
that the new and diverse services valued by the F.C.C. will not be the
services valued by the consuming public. Inefficiencies in supply se-
lection may result from comparative hearings. Finally, in a sellers'
market, comparative hearing will likely lead to no less price competi-
tion than will lotteries or auctions. However, because of the costs of
comparative hearings to the applicants, licensees may need to pass
the cost on to their customers. The size of the passed on cost will
depend on how closely the F.C.C. decides to control common carrier
rates.
Comparative hearings have some additional drawbacks that can-
not be ignored. Comparative hearings for broadcast licenses are ex-
pensive and time consuming. The applicants must hire consultants
and attorneys to prepare and prosecute application for times of up to
five years.' 72 The F.C.C. must also allocate increasingly scarce re-
170 A worst case scenario is the best and truest test of any system.
171 The history of comparative hearings contains numerous allegations of improper
practices. See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE PROFESSOR AND THE COMMISSIONS (1959).
172 Time delays of five years will not likely occur in orbital-spectrum hearings after the
issuance of new comparative hearing rules by the F.C.C. and because an orbital-spectrum
hearing would not involve questions of programming. 56 Fed. Reg. 787 (1991).
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sources to the decision process. In the words of economists, com-
parative hearings involve high transactional costs. Because of these
high transactional costs and other reasons, the F.C.C., as early as
Domsat i,173 has done its best to avoid comparative hearings in orbi-
tal-spectrum licensing decisions.' 74
While comparative hearings will bring about many of the results
sought, auctions will do a better job and also reap added benefits.
When the auctioning of unlimited orbital-spectrum licenses is per-
mitted, the incentive to use a license in the most efficient manner
possible is at its highest. New competitors will search for any nook
or cranny in the orbital-spectrum that will accommodate a satellite.
That search will be more than a combing of existing charts and ta-
bles, it will include looking for new ways to squeeze a new orbital-
spectrum location out of an apparently saturated orbit or negotiating
two uses out of what was once just a one use location. Undoubtedly
engineers will be involved in this search and new technologies will be
tried. If a profit can be made from putting another satellite in the
orbit, and doing so means developing new technology, the use of the
geostationary orbit and the service received by the public will be the
better for it. Also, if operators have to pay for orbital slots they will
be discouraged from stockpiling locations and encouraged to use as
little of the orbit as possible.
The auctioning of unlimited licenses will also stimulate price
and service competition better than lotteries or comparative hear-
ings. More licensed users of the orbit means more providers offering
services to the consuming public. A larger supply should lead to a
reduced price as there will be fewer customers per provider to bid up
the price. While providers will be paying for the right to use the
orbital-spectrum, something not done now, and passing that cost on
to their customers, the increased competition should at the least bal-
ance off the added cost.
Auctions, in some observer's opinions, might have the potential
to create a monopolistic or oligopolistic market. With the high cost
of market entry this is possible. However, the F.C.C., with the help
of the Justice Department, could easily develop a pre-bidding or
post-bidding oversight process. Additionally, if the F.C.C., using its
authority under title II over common carriers, maintains its control
over the rates changed, the potential abuses of an oligopoly can be
guarded against.
Auction can also produce some desirable side effects. First, the
173 In re Domestic Communication-Satellite Facilities by Non-Governmental Entities,
22 F.C.C.86 (1970).
174 The F.C.C. first stated this position in Domsat 11. See Domestic Communication-
Satellite Facilities by Non-Governmental Entities, 35 F.C.C.2d 844, 850 (1972). See also In
re Assignment of Orbital Locations to Space Stations in the Domestic Fixed-Satellite Ser-
vice, 3 F.C.C.R. 6972 (1988).
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government will receive payment, rents, for what is now given away
free. Second, if satellite operators are forced to pay for the use of
the radio-spectrum, their prices will reflect the true cost of the ser-
vice rather than an artificial and subsidized price. With prices that
reflect true costs, the consuming public will be able to make a true
comparison between satellite services and competing technologies
like fiber-optics. Third, the censorship that might develop in a com-
parative hearing system will be avoided.
VII. Conclusion
In the final analysis, the open skies policy served the F.C.C., the
telecommunications industry, and the consuming public well. Under
the policy, the United States has developed a world leading telecom-
munication's market. However, the time has come to move beyond
the open skies licensing system in order to maintain the dynamics
and leading character of the current market. The satellite telecom-
munications industry has matured and no longer needs the subsidy
of free use of the orbital-spectrum. But equally, the industry cannot
flourish in a regulatory system that retards innovation and competi-
tion. The open skies system is dead. Long live the auction system.
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